





















The “great compromise” of workers’ compensation, whereby workers relinquished the right to 
sue their employers for negligence in exchange for no-fault compensation for occupational 
injuries, was one of the major tort reforms of the Twentieth Century.  Because participation in 
the workers’ compensation system is usually compulsory, it is difficult to forecast what the real-
world effects might be of making participation voluntary.  However, there is one U.S. state that 
permits employers to decline workers’ compensation coverage, and in which a significant 
number of firms (called “nonsubscribers”) have chosen to do so: Texas.  Since the mid 1990s, 
the prevalence of nonsubscription among large firms has increased dramatically.  This study is 
the first to examine this phenomenon from the firms’ perspective by focusing on the reported 
experiences of large, multi-state nonsubscribers.  Based on responses to a phone survey 
administered to most of the relevant population, the paper contains a number of important 
findings.  First, even though the risk management environment and employee benefits packages 
offered by nonsubscribers differed markedly by industry, respondents were virtually unanimous 
in stating that their main motivation for becoming nonsubscribers was the desire to achieve cost 
savings.  Secondly, all respondents offered occupational-injury benefits similar to those available 
under workers’ compensation.  Some features of these “home-grown” plans were more generous 
than workers’ compensation, whereas other features appeared less favorable to employees.  Not 
only did virtually all companies judge their programs to be successful and report that they had 
achieved cost savings, but most were pleasantly surprised by the magnitude of such savings, 
which reportedly exceeded (on average) fifty percent.  Although the majority of firms reported 
little or no trouble with litigation, claims exceeding $500,000 were the most common among 
manufacturing firms and the least common among retailers.  Finally, nonsubscribers that used 
mandatory arbitration, comprising about 85% of the entire sample, were much less likely than 
other firms to have paid out half-million-dollar claims.  Taken as a whole, these preliminary 
findings suggest that for many large firms, the high cost of workers’ compensation insurance 








  The “great compromise” of workers’ compensation, whereby workers injured on the job 
relinquished the right to sue their employers in exchange for no-fault occupational-injury 
insurance, was one of the major tort reforms of the Twentieth Century.  Every U.S. state adopted 
a workers’ compensation law between 1910 and 1948.
1  To this day, the program remains the 
primary conduit of cash benefits, medical care, and rehabilitation services for workers disabled 
by work-related injuries and illnesses.
2  Although details such as the level and duration of 
benefits vary widely across states, the hallmark of the program is its near universality.  In most 
U.S. states, every company is required to purchase workers’ compensation insurance, whether 
through a private insurance carrier, a state insurance fund, or self-insurance.
3  It is an open 
question whether the transition from a negligence-based tort system to a no-fault strict liability 
system enhances workplace safety, let alone allocative efficiency.
4  Yet given the virtual ubiquity 
of the workers’ compensation system, it is not surprising that most empirical scholars have taken 
the program’s existence for granted, and focused their inquiry on how different aspects of 
regulatory design (such as waiting periods, benefit levels, experience rating, and provider choice) 
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1 See Fishback and Kantor (1998a). 
2 See Krueger and Burton (1990). 
3 A handful of states with compulsory laws provide exemptions for very small firms with fewer than five employees.  
See Shields and Campbell (2002) for a discussion. Railroad workers are also exempted from the workers’ 
compensation system and are instead covered by a tort-based compensation system under the Federal Employers’ 
Liability Act (FELA). See Transportation Research Board (1994) for a discussion. 
4 Although a shift to workers' compensation systems apparently lowered the non-motor vehicle machine death rate 
from 1900-1940, given the difficulty of measuring accident prevention costs, one cannot conclude from these 
findings alone that the latter system is more efficient. See Chelius (1976) for a more detailed discussion. Schwartz 
(1994) notes that from an economic perspective, it is unclear whether tort or workers' compensation systems provide 
better incentives for workplace safety. Fishback (1987) finds that in coal mining industry, fatal accident rates rose 




affect employers’ and employees’ incentives, and in turn, the frequency, duration, and cost of 
claims. 
  This Article explores an issue that has received almost no attention in prior literature:  the 
consequences of converting workers’ compensation from a compulsory system to a voluntary 
one.  Until the early 1970s, many state laws were elective.
5  In 1972, the National Commission 
on State Workmen’s Compensation Laws recommended that workers’ compensation be 
compulsory rather than elective, and by the mid-1970s, nearly all states amended their laws to 
make participation mandatory.
6  After South Carolina passed such an amendment in 1997, Texas 
became the only state in the U.S. with a truly voluntary program.
7  To this day, a substantial 
number of so-called “nonsubscribing” firms decline to offer workers’ compensation coverage in 
Texas.
8  In 2008, for example, about 33% of Texas firms – which jointly employed a quarter of 
Texas’s workforce – were nonsubscribers.
9  Although very small firms (those with 1-4 
employees) have always been the most likely to forgo participation in the traditional workers’ 
compensation system, increasing numbers of “very large” employers (those with 500 or more 
employees in Texas) have followed suit.
10  Indeed, since the mid 1990s, this is the only firm type 
                                                 
5 Shields and Campbell (2002).  The New York Court of Appeals' famous opinion in Ives v. South Buffalo Railway 
Company, 94 N.E. 431 (N.Y. 1911), which struck down a compulsory workers' compensation statute under the state 
constitution, encouraged many other states to pass elective laws, while “keeping benefits low and so restricting 
employers' legal defenses that most employers would 'freely' elect to join the new system” (Howard 2002, 33).  The 
Supreme Court's ruling in Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219 (1917), upholding the constitutionality 
of a compulsory law, finally put such constitutional concerns to rest.  Interestingly, however, it was not until nearly 
half a century later that some states made their workers' compensation statutes compulsory. 
6 Shields and Campbell (2002). See National Commission on State Workmen’s Compensation Laws (1972). 
7 Although workers’ compensation coverage is generally voluntary for private Texas employers, it is mandatory for 
employees of public employers (Texas Labor Code § 406.022), and for private-sector employees hired to perform 
work on public construction projects (Texas Labor Code § 406.096). 
8 New Jersey is the only other state that technically does not require firms to carry WC coverage.  However, given 
the restrictive nature of the statute, no firms in New Jersey have so far chosen to opt out.  See Shields and Campbell 
(2002). 
9 Workers’ Compensation Research Group (2008, 5). 




for which nonsubscription has been steadily increasing.  As of 2008, approximately 26% of all 
very large firms operating in Texas declined to provide workers’ compensation coverage.
11 
  The rise of the nonsubscription phenomenon in Texas raises important questions about 
the rationale for – and consequences of – the mandatory regime that governs the remainder of the 
country.  Virtually all historians agree that the adoption of workers’ compensation laws was 
endorsed not only by workers and insurers, but by employers as well.
12  Economic historians 
Fishback and Kantor, for example, have emphasized the gains to employers of reducing 
uncertainty in accident costs and demonstrated employers’ capacity to offset much of the 
increased costs of the program through reduced wages.
13  If workers’ compensation laws 
received broad-based employer support at the time of their passage, why have so many Texas 
employers chosen to forgo the benefits of the “great compromise” and expose themselves to tort 
liability?  Surprisingly, this question has received almost no prior scholarly attention.   
This paper offers a first glimpse at the real-world consequences of nonsubscription from 
the perspective of large, multi-state companies.  The study design is straightforward.  After 
identifying the population of large, multi-state companies operating in Texas that have opted out 
of workers’ compensation, I invited each to participate in a confidential phone survey.  Most 
firms (89%) that were identified agreed to participate.  The survey covered four major content 
areas: the characteristics of the company; the process of becoming a nonsubscriber; the 
characteristics of the benefit plan offered in lieu of workers’ compensation; and the perceived 
consequences of nonsubscription.       
The survey results contain a number of interesting findings.  First, the typical risk 
management environment and panoply of employee benefits offered by participating firms differ 
                                                 
11 Ibid.  
12 See, for example, Fishback and Kantor (1998a); Fishback and Kantor (1998b); and Howard (2002).  




markedly across industries.  For example, although the majority of all firms offer employee 
wellness programs, manufacturing firms are considerably less likely than other firms to hire 
consultants and/or third-party administrators to help administer their plans.  The prevalence of 
unions, and the percentage of firms offering group health coverage, disability coverage, and/or 
life insurance to all workers also vary by industry.   
Nevertheless, respondents were virtually unanimous in stating that their main motivation 
for becoming nonsubscribers was the desire to achieve cost savings.  The majority of 
respondents (except for manufacturing firms) hired a consulting firm and/or consulted with other 
nonsubscribers during the nonsubscription process.  
The occupational injury plans that firms offered in lieu of workers’ compensation were 
also remarkably similar.  In some respects – for example, the typical absence of any waiting 
period prior to the receipt of wage-replacement benefits, and the absence of any cap on weekly 
benefits – such plans were more generous than workers’ compensation. Yet in other respects – 
for example, the commonplace 24-hour reporting deadlines, absence of employee choice over 
medical providers, absence of any permanent partial or permanent total disability coverage, and 
prevalent caps on total benefits – such plans appeared less favorable to employees.  Moreover, 
presumably in an effort to curb tort liability, a very high fraction (about 85%) of nonsubscriber 
plans channeled disputes to mandatory arbitration.  Not only did virtually all companies deem 
their programs to be a success and report cost savings, but most were pleasantly surprised by the 
magnitude of these savings, which reportedly exceeded (on average) 50% across all industries.     
Finally, although the majority of respondents reported little or no trouble with litigation, 
costly claims (exceeding $500,000) were the most common among manufacturing firms and 




report having paid any costly claims.  As one might expect, firms with mandatory arbitration 
were also much less likely to have paid out half-million-dollar claims.  Although about a quarter 
of all respondents reported settling some claims outside of the nonsubscription plan, this practice 
was especially common among firms that required mandatory arbitration.  
The remainder of the Article proceeds as follows.  Section Two introduces the Texas 
workers’ compensation system and nonsubscribing sector.  Section Three reviews prior literature 
on workers’ compensation, highlighting several strands of scholarship that are especially 
pertinent to Texas nonsubscription.  Section Four describes the design and methodology of the 
survey.  Section Five presents the results.  Section Six reviews the main conclusions and 
suggests promising areas for future research.  The detailed survey findings, as well as an 
appendix listing the survey questions, can be found at the end of the paper.   
 
II.  Overview of Texas Workers’ Compensation System and the Nonsubscription Alternative 
 
  In order to grasp the key features of nonsubscription, it is helpful first to understand the 
basic structure of ’the workers’ compensation program in Texas.  Except for its elective nature, 
Texas’s workers’ compensation statute is similar to those that govern other U.S. jurisdictions.  
To receive benefits, employees must report injuries within 30 days of the date that the injury 
occurred.
14  As in most states, the statute provides for full medical benefits (with no copays, time 
limits, or monetary caps), and wage replacement benefits are untaxed.
15  Texas also allows 
employees to select their treating physician, unless their employer has taken advantage of recent 
                                                 
14 Office of Injured Employee Counsel of the State of Texas.  If an employee sustains an occupational disease, 
however, the “date of injury” is the date on which the employee knew or should have known that the disease was 
related to his/her employment (Texas Labor Code § 408.007).  In practice, therefore, an occupational disease may be 
reported more than 30 days after the date on which it was contracted.  
15 See International Association of Industrial Accident Boards and Commissions, and Workers Compensation 




legislation enabling firms to join Certified Workers’ Compensation Networks.
16  Employees 
suffering from temporary total, permanent total, or permanent partial disabilities receive 70-75% 
of their weekly wage, tax-free
17 – a relatively generous reimbursement rate by national 
standards.
18  Like about half of U.S. states, Texas’s statute imposes a 7-day waiting period prior 
to the receipt of any wage replacement benefits, although the first week’s benefits can be claimed 
retroactively if the absence persists for at least fourteen days.
19 
  Although the basic statutory features of Texas’s workers’ compensation system resemble 
those of other states, trends in the frequency and cost of claims have been surprisingly variable in 
recent years. As recently as 2001, Texas had among the highest costs per claim (including 
medical payments per claim) among a group of fourteen states analyzed in a “benchmarking” 
study conducted by the Workers Compensation Research Institute (WCRI).
20  The percentages of 
claims involving over a week of lost time, permanent partial disabilities, and/or lump-sum 
payments were also usually high.  Beginning in approximately 2002, however, these trends 
underwent a striking reversal.  A confluence of systemic trends – such as falling rates of medical 
care utilization, fee schedule decreases that took effect in 2003, and shortening duration of 
                                                 
16 Ibid., 25. For an overview of the network program, see Health & Workers’ Compensation Division. If the 
employee is not in a Workers' Compensation Health Care Network, (s)he may choose any doctor willing to treat 
his/her injury. See Office of Injured Employee Counsel of the State of Texas. 
17 Employees earning less than $8.50/hour receive 75% of lost wages during the first 26 weeks of disability, and 
70% of lost wages thereafter.  All other employees receive wage replacement benefits at a rate of 70% of lost wages 
(Texas Labor Code § 408.103). 
18 See International Association of Industrial Accident Boards and Commissions, and Workers Compensation 
Research Institute (2009, 29-47).  Until October 1, 2006, Texas’s maximum benefit amounts were relatively low by 
national standards.  Since that date, however, the maximum rates have been increased by about 15% (to $773 for 
temporary total and permanent total disability, and $541 for permanent partial disability). See Division of Workers’ 
Compensation (2009).  Although these maximum rates are close to the middle of the national distribution, the 
maximum periods applicable to most injury types (104 weeks for temporary total disability, 401 for unlisted 
permanent total disabilities, and 300 weeks for permanent partial disability) remain relatively short by national 
standards (as of July 1, 2008). See International Association of Industrial Accident Boards and Commissions, and 
Workers Compensation Research Institute (2009, 29-47). 
19 The Texas legislature reduced the length of the “retroactive period” on September 1, 2005 (Texas Labor Code § 
408.082) from 28 days to 14 days.  Prior to the change, Texas had one of the longest “retroactive periods” in the 
country, but now has a “retroactive period” in the middle of the national distribution. See International Association 
of Industrial Accident Boards and Commissions, and Workers Compensation Research Institute (2009, 76-78).  




temporary disabilities – led to a decline in both medical costs and indemnity payments per 
claim.
21 By the middle of the decade, outcomes in Texas were far more typical of the group as a 
whole.  For example, among all claims arising in 2004 (and evaluated as of 2007), average total 
cost per claim was only 6.3% above the 14-state median; and among those claims involving 
more than a week of lost time, average per-claim cost was 7.7% below the median.
22  Although 
WCRI’s detailed analysis of more recent claims (such as those arising in 2006 and evaluated as 
of 2007) revealed somewhat different patterns, overall, the cost structure of Texas’ workers’ 
compensation system has remained fairly typical of the group as the whole.
23         
Given these recent trends, using Texas nonsubscribers’ experiences to predict the likely 
effects of nonsubscription in other states is no simple matter.  For example, if Texas’s unusually 
high costs prior to 2002 were driven by the very peculiarities of its regulatory regime that later 
became targets for statutory reform, then the state may have provided a uniquely hospitable (and 
profitable) environment for nonsubscription during the pre-reform era.
24  Nevertheless, since 
Texas remains the only available “laboratory” in which nonsubscription can be examined, 
understanding large nonsubscribers’ own views of the “nonsubscription experience” in a 
granular fashion – including which programmatic features they have chose to include in their 
“home-grown” plans, and which aspects they have viewed as particularly problematic or 
beneficial – is a useful first step toward understanding the consequences of an elective regime.   
                                                 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid., 77. 
23 Ibid., 11, 15, 17. 
24 Recent changes in the regulatory environment have also probably complicated the ability of participants to discern 
the underlying drivers of trends in costs per claim.  For example, although firms that opted out prior to 2002 may 
have attributed any and all subsequent cost savings to the adoption of the nonsubscription plan, it is possible that 
they would have accrued at least some of these savings even if they had remained in the workers’ compensation 
system.   For this reason, estimates of cost savings reported by nonsubscribers that opted out just prior to or during 




Although nonsubscribers have probably existed in Texas ever since the passage of the 
first workers’ compensation statute in 1913, data on such firms was not collected in a systematic 
fashion for most of the Twentieth Century.
25  Not until the early 1990s, in fact, did the Texas 
Workers’ Compensation Research Center and Texas Department of Insurance (TDI) begin 
commissioning periodic surveys to shed light on the prevalence and attributes of nonsubscribers.  
Administered to firms of all types (and in some cases, their employees) every 1-3 years, these 
surveys (the “TDI Surveys”) were much more abbreviated than the survey used for the present 
study.  However, since they were administered to a broad cross-section of firms, it is helpful to 
review their key findings.   
First of all, the surveys reveal that by most measures, nonsubscription has become 
increasingly prevalent over the past fifteen years.  The first TDI Survey, conducted in 1993, 
estimated that 44% of employers in Texas were nonsubscribers and 20% of workers were 
employed by nonsubcribing firms.
26  Although the 2008 survey found that the percentage of 
nonsubscribing firms had fallen to 33%, the percentage of workers employed by nonsubscribers 
had risen to 25%.
27  This puzzling trend is explained by the fact that rates of nonsubscription 
have increased dramatically (from 14% to 26%) among very large firms (those employing 500 or 
more employees), despite the general decline in nonsubscription rates among Texas employers 
since 1996.
28  Interestingly, once a firm chooses to become a nonsubscriber, it is likely to remain 
so: only 5% of subscribers surveyed in 2001 reported having been nonsubscribers at an earlier 
point in time.
29   
                                                 
25 Shields and Campbell (2002). 
26 Ibid. 
27 Workers’ Compensation Research Group (2008, 6-7). 
28 Ibid., 8. 




  A second important finding is the frequency with which nonsubscribers – especially large 
ones – offer occupational injury benefit plans (“nonsubscription plans”) to their employees, even 
though they are not legally obligated to do so.  In 2008, for example, an estimated 83% of large 
firms offered occupational benefits plans to their workers.
30  Since large firms employ a 
disproportionate number of workers, the estimated proportion of injured employees employed by 
nonsubscribers who received occupational benefits was 86%.
31 
Finally, nonsubscribing firms appear to be more satisfied with their risk-management 
programs than are firms that subscribe to workers’ compensation.  For example, nonsubscribers 
in 2008 reported higher satisfaction with the “adequacy/equity of occupational benefits paid to 
workers” (62% v. 53%); “overall satisfaction” (69% v. 61%); “whether the plan is a good value 
for the company” (69% v. 56%); and “ability to manage medical and wage replacement costs” 
(68% v. 50%).  These disparities were even more pronounced among firms with at least 100 
employees, with 84% of nonsubscribers describing themselves as “extremely” or “somewhat” 
satisfied with their risk-management programs, as opposed to just 59% of workers’ 
compensation subscribers.
32       
TDI’s 1997 survey of nonsubscribers’ injured employees – the most recent employee 
survey available – contains several important findings.  First, most workers received substantial 
                                                 
30 Workers’ Compensation Research Group (2008, 24).  The fact that the prevalence of nonsubscription plans in 
2008 was reportedly lower among large firms than among medium-sized firms in 2008 – a pattern that was reversed 
in 2006 – is puzzling.  See Workers’ Compensation Research Group (2006).  Although it is possible that the 
prevalence of such plans among large firms has declined in the last several years, this curious finding could also be 
explained by reporting error, sampling error, and/or changes in the way firms are categorized across survey years.  
In addition, a prominent stakeholder (who requested anonymity) suggested that the true figure is higher than 83% 
because many nonsubscribers that do not “officially” offer occupational-injury insurance nevertheless provide 
benefits to their injured workers on an informal basis (Telephone interview, October 13, 2009).  Using publicly-
available data, I could neither verify nor disprove this claim.       
31 Workers’ Compensation Research Group (2008, 24).  Once again, it is puzzling that the prevalence figures 
reported for 2008 – although still very high – are lower than for previous years.  It is uncertain whether such trends 
are genuine or simply reflect reporting error, sampling error, and/or inconsistency of definitions across survey years.       




medical care and wage-replacement benefits.
 33  For example, over 80% of respondents were 
reimbursed for full medical costs for as long as was medically necessary as well as wage-
replacement benefits for their time out of work.
34  Although 58% reportedly earned less than 
their full salaries (as would also have been the case under workers’ compensation), 62% received 
wage-replacement benefits for the entire duration of their lost work time.  Moreover, unlike the 
seven-day waiting period required under workers’ compensation, injured employees typically 
begin receiving benefits on their first day of lost work.
35  Although 74% of respondents were 
sent to designated health-care providers or selected physicians from a pre-approved list, almost 
two-thirds said that they could switch doctors if they were dissatisfied.  A similar proportion 
(68%) said they “were treated fairly” by their employer after sustaining an injury, with more than 
half indicating that their employer in some way assisted their return to work.
36  Overall, when 
asked to rate their satisfaction with medical treatment on a scale of 1 to 5 (with 5 being 
“extremely satisfied” and 1 being “not satisfied”), 63% reported satisfaction levels of 4 or 
higher.
37       
Yet a significant minority did face significant obstacles under nonsubscription.  For 
example, among workers who lost more than one year of work, only 42% received wage-
replacement benefits for the full duration of their disability.
38  About one-seventh of respondents 
(14% and 16%, respectively) also reported difficulties in obtaining medical treatment or wage-
                                                 
33 Since 91% of sampled employees worked for firms with 50 or more employees, the results of the survey should be 
construed as typical only for this employer size class. Workers’ Compensation Research Group (1997, 6-7). 
34 Ibid., 15. 
35 Workers’ Compensation Research Group (2004, 30) notes that 75% of nonsubscriber plans have no waiting period 
for receipt of wage replacement benefits. See Butler (1996). 
36 Workers’ Compensation Research Group (2008, 23). The 56% was calculated by summing the percentage who 
gave their employer's support a “4” or “5” rating on a five-point scale. 
37 Ibid. 




replacement checks from their employer or insurance carrier.
39  Finally, 46% of injured workers 
said they “suffered financial hardship” as a result of their on-the-job injury, and this proportion 
rose slightly (to 52%) among workers who had been severely injured.  Possibly for the above 
reasons, almost one-fifth (18%) of respondents rated their “satisfaction with medical treatment” 
as a 1 or 2 (the lowest ratings) on a 5-point scale.
40  
Several other trends in the employee survey are worthy of note.  First, only 35% of 
respondents said they knew about their employer’s nonsubscriber status at the time of hiring, 
although 65% did learn of it before their injury occurred.  Secondly, although the Texas Labor 
Code requires employers to post a notice indicating whether or not they carry workers’ 
compensation coverage, only 55% of respondents reported having seen such a notice.
41  Finally, 
reported rates of attorney involvement were remarkably low; only 13% of respondents hired an 
attorney and only 9% filed a lawsuit in the wake of an injury.
42   
  Although the preceding findings are suggestive, the TDI Surveys must be interpreted 
with caution.  The employee satisfaction surveys, in particular, are more than a decade out of 
date and are based only on employees of nonsubscribers.  Without an appropriate “control 
group” of employees whose injuries are treated under workers’ compensation, there is no way to 
determine whether workers are better or worse off under a nonsubscription regime.  Secondly, 
since most of the results are pooled, they rarely reveal whether (and how) outcomes differ by 
company size.   
Nevertheless, these surveys do bring several interesting patterns to light.  First and 
foremost, most nonsubscribers did not ask employees to shoulder the costs of injuries that were 
                                                 
39 Workers’ Compensation Research Group (2008, 23). 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid.  See Texas Labor Code § 406.005. 




noncompensable under a traditional (tort) standard of employer negligence.  Rather, most 
nonsubscribers offered some form of “no-fault” insurance coverage for all occupational injuries.  
Second, at least in their basic attributes, the nonsubscription plans offered by large 
nonsubscribers resembled the benefits provided under workers’ compensation, typically 
including both medical and wage-replacement components.  Finally, although most workers 
were unaware that they were ineligible for workers’ compensation when hired, the majority 
seemed fairly satisfied with their coverage and treatment following an injury (although again, it 
is unknown whether they would have fared better or worse under workers’ compensation).   
The survey used for the present study is both narrower and “deeper” than those 
administered by TDI.  On one hand, the population from which the sample is drawn includes 
only large, multi-state companies, and only risk management executives (not their injured 
employees) were interviewed.  On the other hand, the survey contains more extensive and 
granular questions about each firm’s motivation for opting out of workers’ compensation, the 
characteristics of its occupational injury plan, and its experience with nonsubscription.   
 
III.  Key Issues in Worker’s Compensation Research 
 
Richard Butler is the only prior scholar to have compared trends among subscribing and 
nonsubscribing firms in Texas.  Using aggregate company-level data, Butler (1996) compared 
fatality rates, nonfatal claims rates, injury durations, and rates of chronic injuries (i.e., sprains 
and strains) across subscribing and nonsubscribing firms.  The data did not allow him to control 
for cross-firm (let alone cross-claimant) disparities in risk, and the period analyzed (1992-1994) 
predated the influx of most large, multi-state companies into the nonsubscribing sector.
43  
Nevertheless, Butler’s findings are suggestive.  He reported that fatal injury rates were no higher 
                                                 




among nonsubscribers than among other firms, which he interpreted as evidence that “real” 
safety levels were probably quite similar.  Yet he did find differences in several other outcome 
variables, which he attributed to two different forms of moral hazard.  The fact that 
nonsubscribers experienced slightly higher nonfatal injury rates, he suggested, was probably 
explained by the fact that most nonsubscriber plans provided first-day wage-replacement 
benefits, as opposed to the seven-day waiting period applicable under workers’ compensation.  
Meanwhile, nonsubscribers’ lower average claim duration, and lower average frequency of 
chronic conditions, likely stemmed from the fact that nonsubscriber plans (unlike statutory 
workers’ compensation) did not compensate employees for permanent partial disabilities.
44  
Although Butler attempted to compare per-claim cost differences across sectors, his projections 
were based on projected rather than actual cost data.
45  Notwithstanding the inherent limitations 
of the data available for analysis, Butler’s study underscored the disparate incentives faced by 
workers in the subscribing and nonsubscribing sectors, and suggested that such disparities could 
have detectable effects on the frequency, distribution, severity, and duration of claims.  
With the exception of Butler’s study, all other empirical research on workers’ 
compensation has taken the program’s existence for granted and focused on how different 
elements of statutory design affect key outcomes.
46  Consequently, most prior work does not 
speak directly to the issue examined here: the impact of forfeiting state regulation. Nevertheless, 
since many nonsubscribers do offer occupational benefit plans whose provisions resemble those 
                                                 
44 Ibid., 412, 426. 
45 Rather than using real cost data,  Butler's “expected indemnity” cost index calculation of cost differences simply 
takes the industry-wide aggregate differences in frequencies calculated earlier as given, further assuming that 
benefits are comparable across sectors, and then makes projected cost calculations on that basis.  Similarly, his 
calculations of legal expenses are not based on data for all claims, since TDI only records cost figures for claims that 
exceed $5,000.  Although he also culls settlement award data from legal reporting services for 1993 and 1994, 
Butler notes that the available data are likely to be incomplete. See Butler (1996, 429). 
46 The only exceptions of which I am aware are two historical studies of the passage of workers’ compensation laws 




of workers’ compensation, several recurring themes addressed in prior scholarship merit a brief 
summary.     
The first key issue with which prior scholarship has grappled is the pervasive and 
dizzyingly complex ways in which changes in systemic design encourage moral hazard.  With 
“risk-bearing” moral hazard, generous occupational injury plans incentivize employees to take 
fewer precautions on the job, thereby lowering real (and reported) safety levels.  Meanwhile, 
when benefits rise, “claims-reporting” moral hazard encourages employees to file claims even if 
they were injured off the job (or were not injured at all).  By parallel logic, reducing the share of 
occupational-injury costs borne by an employer – for example, by lowering benefit levels or 
eliminating experience rating – weakens employers’ incentives to invest in safety-enhancing 
work practices or technologies.  Health care providers, in turn, may charge higher fees or order 
more procedures if treating workers’ compensation patients is more remunerative than Medicare 
and/or group health insurance.  In short, because changes in systemic design alter the behavior of 
industry stakeholders in a myriad of ways, discerning the true effects of any given policy 
intervention poses difficult challenges.  
The empirical literature on moral hazard effects in the workers’ compensation system is 
vast and multifaceted.  Nearly all studies have found that increasing benefits and/or lowering 
waiting periods increases the frequency, cost, and/or duration of claims, apparently confirming 
the presence of risk-bearing and/or claims-reporting moral hazard.
47  The claims-reporting form 
                                                 
47 See Chelius (1982); Worrall and Appel (1982); Butler and Worrall (1983); Ruser (1985); Worrall and Butler 
(1985); Butler and Worrall (1985); Ehrenberg (1988); Butler and Worrall (1988); Kniesner and Leeth (1989); 
Krueger (1990b); Butler and Worrall (1991); Ruser (1991); Butler (1994); Meyer, Vicusi, and Durbin (1995); 
Kaestner and Carroll (1997); Bolduc, Fortin, Labrecque, and Lanoie (2002); Waehrer and Miller (2003); Neuhauser 
and Raphael (2004).  Krueger (1990a) finds that higher benefits are not associated with higher injury claims among 
female CPS respondents. Krueger and Burton (1990) find costs to be less responsive to benefit levels that previous 
estimates, and in some cases not significantly different from unit elastic). Lakdawalla, Reville, and Seabury (2007) 
find that level of benefits offered by employer did not affect respondents' likelihood of filing claim in NLSY data).  




of moral hazard, which one study suggested is larger in magnitude,
48 seems especially 
pronounced for injuries that are hard to diagnose, such as muscle strains and back injuries.
49  
Empirical research has also lent credence to the hypothesis that firms bearing a greater 
proportion of the cost of injuries invest more in safety.  For example, although increasing wage-
replacement benefits seems to improve “real” safety levels,
50 the effect is attenuated in 
experience-rated firms, whose insurance premiums already (by definition) reward safe work 
practices.
51  Similarly, employees of self-insured firms return to work more quickly than other 
workers, presumably because a prolonged absence is more costly to their employers.
52  Although 
studies of medical care providers have found that medical costs for similar injuries are generally 
higher in workers’ compensation than in group health, the underlying causal mechanism remains 
a fertile subject of debate.
53  Several authors have speculated that price-discriminating medical 
providers charge workers’ compensation patients more than group health patients for the same 
care,
54 but one recent study found that the disparity is driven instead by higher utilization rates 
and the use of more costly providers.
55 
                                                                                                                                                             
for sprains and strains are filed on Mondays (a disparity that does not exist for harder-to-conceal injuries like cuts 
and lacerations) as evidence that workers are “post-dating” weekend back injuries and strains to obtain workers' 
compensation coverage. A more recent empirical study, however, has disputed the existence of this so-called 
“Monday effect.” See Card and McCall (1996). 
48 Butler and Worrall (1991). 
49 See Smith (1990); Butler and Worrall (1985); Worrall and Butler (1985); Biddle (2001); Waehrer and Miller 
(2003); Johnson, Baldwin, and Butler (1998); and Bolduc, Fortin, Labrecque, and Lanoie (2002). 
50 See Chelius (1982); Moore and Viscusi (1992); Kniesner and Leeth (1989); and Kaestner and Carroll (1997). But 
Fishback (1987, 306) finds that adoption of workers' compensation in mining industry in early 1900s increased rates 
of fatal injuries, presumably because of the rise in moral hazard associated with rising compensation. 
51  The theory – which these studies seem to support – is that the firm's enhanced incentives to improve workplace 
safety lowers the frequency of injuries, thereby dampening the moral hazard effects triggered by higher benefits 
levels. See Ruser (1991); Worrall and Butler (1988); and Ruser (1985). 
52 Krueger (1990b). 
53 See Fields and Venezian (1991); Baker and Krueger (1993); Roberts and Zonia (1994); and Durbin, Corro, and 
Helvacian (1996). 
54 See Fields and Venezian (1991) and Baker and Krueger (1993). Roberts and Zonia (1994) find that health care 
providers successfully circumvented fee schedules by doing more in less time and exploiting textual ambiguities.   




A second salient theme explored in prior scholarship is the impact of systemic design on 
the incidence of occupational injury costs.  If labor markets are relatively well-functioning, the 
cost to employers of providing workers’ compensation should be at least partially offset by lower 
wages (although the magnitude of such an offset will depend on the size of compensating wage 
differentials and the degree of workers’ compensation experience rating).  Although nearly all 
studies have confirmed the existence of a wage-benefit tradeoff, estimates of its magnitude vary 
by industry, region, and historical era.  The implication seems to be that although workers are 
sufficiently well-informed to exchange at least some proportion of their wages for the insurance 
benefits that the system provides, variations in systemic design and labor market conditions can 
affect the content of the implicit bargain.
56 
Finally, although many scholars have tackled the question of ultimate policy interest – the 
effects of systemic design changes on occupational safety and health – identification of “real” 
safety effects remains fraught with methodological challenges.  In part, this is because of the 
sheer complexity of incentives facing industry stakeholders, the scarcity of disaggregated data on 
workers’ compensation in the public domain, and the fact that so many dimensions of workers’ 
compensation regimes differ across state lines.  Probably the single most important obstacle, 
however, is the paucity of truly exogenous safety metrics that are invulnerable to changes in 
over- or under-reporting.  For example, an increase in benefit levels can be expected to 
simultaneously increase claims-reporting moral hazard (which increases reported claims but does 
not affect real safety); risk-taking moral hazard (which increases reported claims and lowers real 
safety); and employer investments in safety (which lower reported claims and increase real 
safety).  The net effect of such a change on occupational safety is therefore not only theoretically 
                                                 
56 See Kaestner and Carroll (1997); Moore and Viscusi (1989); Viscusi and Moore (1987); Meng, and Smith (1999); 




indeterminate, but also typically unobservable, since the only safety metric usually available to 
researchers is the frequency of reported claims.  Thus although the literature on the effect of 
systemic design on occupational injury claims is immense, studies that purport to distinguish 
“true” safety effects from over- (or under-) reporting are scarce.         
Those few studies that have sought to discern the effects of systemic design on “true” 
safety levels contain mixed findings.  For example, two studies have linked an increase in 
workers’ compensation benefits to a decline in occupational fatalities and to a decline in injury 
severity, respectively.
57  Similarly, a historical study found that the passage of workers’ 
compensation laws in the early nineteenth century reduced occupational fatalities.
58  However, a 
historical analysis of the introduction of workers’ compensation laws in coal mining, relying on 
more granular and precise data, found that fatal accidents rose with the introduction of workers’ 
compensation.
59  Studies on the effects of provider choice (permitting employees to choose their 
own physician) were equally equivocal:  although one found that state-enforced limits on 
provider choice did not lower the frequency of nonfatal injuries,
60 another found that limiting 
injured workers’ control over their providers lowered costs and shortened the time spent out of 
work, although it also reduced employee satisfaction.
61   
By uncovering the characteristics, motivations and experiences of an important group of 
large nonsubscribers, the present study builds on past literature by providing a more sustained 
glimpse inside the “black box” of nonsubscription in Texas.  Identifying systemic design features 
that corporate risk managers have chosen to forgo in a free-market system suggests which 
characteristics of state regulation employers perceive as the most costly or inefficient.  More 
                                                 
57 Moore and Viscusi (1989); See also Chelius (1982). 
58 Chelius (1976). 
59 Fishback (1987). 
60 Boden and Ruser (2003). 




broadly, understanding the consequences of nonsubscription from the perspective of 
participating firms is an important first step in understanding the costs and benefits of an elective 
statutory regime.  
 
V.  Survey Design and Methodology 
 
Since nonsubscribers are an extremely heterogeneous group – ranging from “mom and 
pop” shops to multi-national retail chains – I sought at the outset to limit the study criteria in a 
manner that would be advantageous from a research design perspective.  First of all, I adopted a 
minimum size restriction.  Large firms are the only group for which nonsubscription rates have 
increased (and dramatically so) in recent years, making them particularly interesting and 
important from a policy perspective.
62  Moreover, risk management executives at large 
companies are more likely to be full-time professionals with prior experience in the risk 
management field, whose responsibilities include the periodic review of occupational-injury 
insurance costs and trends in injury claims.  In contrast, their counterparts at smaller companies 
are more likely to be “jacks-of-all-trades” with little background in risk management who devote 
much of their time to unrelated managerial tasks.  Restricting the sample to large firms, 
therefore, maximized the chances that survey respondents would be well-informed about the 
costs and benefits of nonsubscription.   
Secondly, I restricted the sample to firms that operate in a sizable number of U.S. states 
besides Texas.  This “minimum dispersion” restriction was chosen because many of the survey 
questions, whether explicitly or implicitly, asked respondents to draw comparisons between their 
experience under statutory workers’ compensation and their experience in Texas as 
                                                 
62 According to Texas Department of Insurance survey data, the participation rate among companies with 500+ 
employees nearly doubled from 1996 to 2008 (from 14% to 26%).  In contrast, the percentage of nonsubscribers 
declined in all other employer size classes during the same time period. See Workers’ Compensation Research 




nonsubscribers.  Although it is fair to presume that all risk managers of large nonsubscribers 
have at least a rudimentary familiarity with the workers’ compensation system, executives that 
oversee such programs in many other states are in the best position to make credible and nuanced 
comparisons between the nonsubscription and workers’ compensation regimes. 
  In order to include a diverse mix of companies, I did not impose uniform size and 
dispersion thresholds across the entire population of large, multi-state nonsubscribers.  For 
example, while a retail chain or commercial bank with fewer than 100 locations would not 
generally be considered “large,” even the largest manufacturing firms typically operate (at most) 
only a few dozen facilities.  Therefore, imposing uniform thresholds would have meant either 
excluding all large manufacturing firms (by choosing a high threshold) or including many 
smaller retailers (by choosing a low threshold).  I divided the population into six groupings – 
manufacturing firms; restaurant chains; other retail chains (such as department stores, gas 
stations, and “big-box” retailers); hotel chains; transportation companies; and other services 
companies (such as assisted living facilities, nursing homes, and banks) – and selected separate 
minimum thresholds for each group, in such a way that only the largest and most geographically 
dispersed firms in each grouping were included.  Table 1 presents the minimum size thresholds 
(as defined by number of employees and number of locations) and minimum dispersion 
thresholds (as defined by number of states of operation) for each grouping.  Although all of the 
firms identified would generally be considered large, multi-state corporations, the population as a 
whole was still reasonably heterogeneous with regard to the minimum number of employees, 
number of facilities, geographic dispersion, and industrial attributes. 
  Since there is no comprehensive listing of Texas nonsubscribers in the public domain, 




used a two-stage strategy.  First, I identified key industry stakeholders and other well-informed 
individuals, and secured their assistance in identifying and recruiting potential participants.
63  By 
the end of this process, I had identified 47 firms meeting the study criteria.  Next, I culled 
through the list of nonsubscribers maintained by the Texas Department of Insurance.  Although 
the list is notoriously incomplete and outdated, listing only about 7500 establishments (less than 
5% of the estimated population), it nevertheless yielded an additional 14 names.
64  Once the final 
list had been compiled, I contacted the risk manager of each company by e-mail and/or phone – 
sometimes independently, and sometimes after an introduction by another stakeholder – to 
personally introduce myself, describe the survey, and request his/her participation.  Of the 61 
companies that were identified as meeting the survey criteria, 54 (about 89%) agreed to 
participate under strict confidentiality provisions, although several declined to answer a few 
survey questions.
65  
  Table 1 describes the distribution of the population identified.  The retail sector 
comprised about half of the study population and includes restaurants, department stores, big-box 
retailers, gas stations and supermarkets.  (Special thresholds were imposed for restaurants 
because they tend to be slightly more geographically dispersed, yet have fewer total locations, 
than other retailers.)  Comprising about a third of the population, the services group included a 
                                                 
63 The organizations with whom I spoke included the Texas Alliance of Nonsubscribers (generally known as the 
“Alliance”); another industry organization that requested anonymity; and a consulting firm, PartnerSource, that 
specializes in assisting firms to become nonsubscribers.   
64 See Texas Nonsubscribers Download File. Although a query on to http://www.tracer2.com/ indicates that there 
were 439,614 employers doing business in 2009, and the 2008 TDI survey found that about 33% of Texas 
employers were nonsubscribers (Workers’ Compensation Research Group 2008, 6-7), the most recent Texas 
Nonsubscribers Download File contains only 7,549 entries. Therefore, it appears that only about 5% of 
nonsubscribers are included in the list. 
65 As should be evident from the above description, the process of identifying firms was not foolproof.  Therefore, 
the true number of qualifying firms may exceed 61.  For example, any firm that was not identified by any 
stakeholder, and did not comply with state reporting requirements, would probably not have come to light.   
Moreover, it is possible that even some nonsubscribers that were listed in the Texas Nonsubscribers Download File 
were not identified because they were listed through a subsidiary, holding company, or other related corporate entity 
whose identity was not readily apparent.  For these reasons, it is possible that there are a few large multi-state 




diverse admixture of hotels, transportation companies, assisted living facilities, banks, health 
care providers and property management companies.  (Once again, special thresholds were 
imposed for two subgroups, hotels and transportation firms, to account for their slightly different 
industrial characteristics.)  Manufacturing, at about one-eighth of the study population, included 
relatively low thresholds for both employment and minimum number of locations. 
The survey covered four general content areas: (1) corporate characteristics (including 
the respondent’s employee benefit profile and risk management environment); (2) the 
nonsubscription process (including the motivations for and timing of the firm’s opt-out decision); 
(3) the nonsubscription plan (reporting deadlines, benefit levels, time limits, and so forth); and 
(4) the nonsubscription experience.  Although following a loose script (see Appendix), the phone 
survey was administered in a flexible, responsive manner, and typically took between 15 to 30 
minutes to complete.  All 54 participating firms were surveyed between March and July of 2009.    
I chose not to emulate the TDI Surveys by presenting respondents with a “laundry list” of 
responses from which to choose, and/or asking them to rate their experience along a fixed 
numeric scale.  Rather, questions that were not purely factual in nature – for example, questions 
that asked respondents to describe the nonsubscription process, or to opine on the benefits and 
drawbacks of nonsubscription – were posed in an open-ended and somewhat individualized 
fashion, and ambiguous responses were clarified through follow-up questions.  This approach 
has its drawbacks.  For example, some respondents may have forgotten to mention aspects of 
their experience that more specific prompting could have elicited, and minor variations in the 
way that questions were phrased and/or ordered conceivably could have affected the quality or 
quantity of responses.  However, I felt that a more rigidly structured survey design – for 




importance of a pre-determined list of factors – could inadvertently “frame” the manner in which 
respondents viewed their own experiences, and make them hesitant to editorialize on issues that 
fell outside the technical confines of the survey.  Given the importance of eliciting information 
about aspects of nonsubscribers’ experiences that I did not anticipate, I decided that on balance, 
the benefits of a more open-ended, unstructured survey design outweighed its drawbacks.   
Because I did not administer a similar survey to firms that did subscribe to workers’ 
compensation in Texas, I could not rule out the possibility that large, multi-state firms that opted 
out of Texas workers’ compensation differed systematically, yet unobservably, from those that 
did not.  For example, as compared to large Texas firms included in an online database 
maintained by the Texas Workforce Commission (TWC), the study participants seemed to 
employ more workers, operate more facilities, and report higher total sales within Texas.  The 
magnitude of such disparities varied by industry and ranged anywhere from 10% to 200%.  The 
survey respondents also appeared to be more heavily concentrated in the retail sector – and less 
concentrated in services – than the firms in the TWC sample.  However, because of the poor 
quality of the TWC data and the difficulty of making credible apples-to-apples comparisons, 
such apparent differences could be statistical artifacts.
66  In short, self-selection by large, multi-
                                                 
66 Comparing the study participants to a credibly “similar” group of subscribers was fraught with empirical 
difficulties.  Since the Texas Department of Insurance does not maintain data on companies that subscribe to 
workers’ compensation in Texas, the only publicly available source of such data appeared to be the TWC database.  
The TWC database lists the name, industry, number of employees (in ranges), and approximate annual sales figures 
(reported in ranges) of companies operating in Texas.  (See the “Employer Search” on the Standardized 
Occupational Components for Research and Analysis of Trends in Employment System for the Texas Workforce 
Commission, at http://socrates.cdr.state.tx.us/.)  However, the database was limited in several critical respects.  First, 
it did not distinguish multi-state companies from companies that operate exclusively within Texas.  Since all of the 
survey participants operated in multiple states, one might expect them to be larger, on average, than a comparison 
group including many single-state firms.  (In this sense, they are not truly comparable to the firms contained in the 
TWC sample.)  Secondly, although all information in the TWC database was recorded at the individual facility 
level, careful scrutiny revealed many facilities of large companies to be missing from the database.  (Indeed, some 
large companies were missing entirely.)  Therefore, the company-wide figures calculated from the TWC database –
derived by summing across all facilities – underestimated the true values for many workers’ compensation 
subscribers.  Finally, the TWC database reported only ranges of numerical values, including a top category 




state firms into the nonsubscription sector remained a theoretical possibility whose real-world 
importance I could not reliably determine.  
 However, even if such selection bias did exist, it would not negate the import of the 
study.  To the extent that Texas resembles a “natural experiment,” the form of treatment that it 
represents is not the abolishment of the workers’ compensation system, or the random 
assignment of firms across the workers’ compensation and nonsubscription sectors.  Rather, the 
“treatment” at issue is the replacement of a mandatory (universal) system with an elective one.  
Thus even if the sole effect of an elective statute were to permit a group of “well-positioned” 
companies (i.e. the subset for which it is advantageous) to self-select into the nonsubscribing 
sector, the decision-making processes and experiences of this group would remain a subject of 
scholarly interest.  
 
V.  Results  
  The survey results, presented in Tables 2-6, address five different areas: the basic 
characteristics of the firm and its employee benefit program; the process of becoming a 
nonsubscriber; the provisions of the nonsubscription plan; the firm’s overall experience with 
nonsubscription; and legal issues and concerns.  In addition to aggregate figures, I present 
separate results for each of the three major industry groupings (manufacturing, retail, and 
services), and for each of the two time periods in which firms first opted out of workers’ 
compensation (1990-1994 and 1997-2009).  Although each major industry (and sub-industry) 
                                                                                                                                                             
distribution of firms above the top size cutoff, I had little choice but to use this cutoff for purposes of the estimates.  
(In other words, if a facility was recorded as having “1,000 or more employees,” I simply coded that facility as 
employing 1,000 workers.)  In short, because of the poor quality and insufficient granularity of the TWC data, it was 
not possible to make reliable apples-to-apples comparisons between large, multi-state nonsubscribers and large, 
multi-state firms that subscribed to workers’ compensation.  All of the problems observed in the TWC data would be 
expected to downward bias the estimates of workforce, sales, and number of locations, and could – at least in theory 




grouping contains at least two firms that participated in the survey, I do not report how the 
participants are distributed within the sub-groups that comprised the services sector in order to 
preserve the anonymity of all respondents and the confidentiality of their survey responses.     
  As Table 2 reveals, the sample exhibits significant heterogeneity across industries and 
cohorts.  For example, the mean numbers of employees and claims were more than twice as large 
in the retail sector as in the other two industries.  Manufacturing firms also tended to be less 
geographically dispersed and higher in union density than other firms.  Although union density 
and geographic dispersion varied only modestly by date of nonsubscription, mean employment 
(and claims) levels were about twice as large among the early (1990-1994) cohort, suggesting 
that some of the very largest companies were the first to opt out.   
  Risk management characteristics were fairly similar across groups: at least half of 
respondents in all sectors and across both cohorts employed PartnerSource (a Dallas-based 
consulting firm and insurance agency that caters to Texas nonsubscribers); used a third-party 
administrator (TPA) to process claims; and self-insured and/or purchased high-deductible 
insurance plans in other (i.e., workers’ compensation) jurisdictions.  Since these forms of 
outsourcing and self-insurance are common among large companies, their predominance among 
the study participants is not surprising.  Interestingly, however, both trends were markedly less 
common among manufacturing firms and among the earlier cohort.  
  Information on employee benefits also revealed interesting disparities.  One half of 
manufacturing firms offered in-house first-aid clinics, as compared to only about a third of retail 
and services companies.  Although almost three-quarters of all companies offered employee 
wellness programs, their prevalence was once again the highest (83%) among manufacturing 




insurance, disability coverage, and life insurance.  Whereas most manufacturing firms (86%) 
provided such benefits to their entire workforce, a significantly smaller majority (68-74%) of 
services firms, and only a minority (29-43%) of retail firms, did so.  Members of the later cohort 
were more likely to offer all types of benefits.  
  Table 3 sheds light on the process of nonsubscription by examining companies’ reported 
motivations for nonsubscribing, the timing of their decisions, and the form(s) of outside 
assistance, if any, that they received.  By far the single most common reason for becoming a 
nonsubscriber, cited by 89% of the entire sample (and at least 85% of each industry and cohort), 
was the desire to achieve cost savings.  About half of respondents (47% of the entire group and 
42-56% of each industry and cohort) also mentioned the desire to take better care of injured 
workers, and about a quarter (with some variation by industry and cohort) cited the desire for 
greater control over medical providers and program benefits.  Although about a fifth of services 
companies described expediting employees’ return to work as an important goal, and a third of 
the earlier cohort saw nonsubscription as a means to reduce litigation, few of the other 
respondents expressed these views.   
  The types of outside assistance received during the nonsubscription process varied 
significantly by both industry and cohort.  Overall, manufacturing firms received relatively little 
outside assistance.  One-half of respondents in this sector consulted with other companies; a 
quarter consulted with PartnerSource and/or “other” entities; and none consulted with TPAs or 
outside attorneys.
67  On the other hand, the majority of retail firms consulted with PartnerSource 
(67%) and other nonsubscribers (78%), and significant minorities (39% and 22%, respectively) 
consulted with TPAs and/or “other” entities.  Services firms displayed an intermediate pattern: 
                                                 
67 The “other” entities with whom the survey respondents reportedly consulted included independent consultants, the 
Texas Association of Responsible Nonsubscribers (TXANS), the state of Texas, a risk management services firm, 




while 74% consulted with PartnerSource, significant minorities (40%, 33%, and 27%, 
respectively) consulted with other nonsubscribers, TPAs, and/or outside attorneys.  These 
patterns also varied markedly by cohort.  Whereas a majority of late-cohort members consulted 
with PartnerSource and/or other nonsubscribers, early-cohort members sought less assistance 
overall, and usually confined their consultations to other nonsubscribers (50%) and/or outside 
attorneys (40%).
68 
  The timing of nonsubscription shows a fair degree of uniformity across industries and 
cohorts.  Across all groups, a majority of respondents suggested that the start date was relatively 
arbitrary – for example, the program began “as soon as preparations were complete,” “as soon as 
they learned about it,” at a “convenient” date, or on a date chosen for “no particular reason.”  
Only a third of the respondents changed other policies or practices at the time that they adopted 
their nonsubscription plans.  However, several interesting cross-group disparities did come to 
light.  For example, manufacturing firms – as well as retail firms and members of the later cohort 
– were more likely to harmonize the start date of nonsubscription with a significant corporate 
milestone (such as the renewal date of an insurance policy or TPA contract), or with the start of 
the fiscal year or business cycle.  Manufacturing was also the only industry in which a majority 
of firms (57%) changed other policies coincident with nonsubscription, and in which a 
substantial proportion (40%) adopted nonsubscription plans in the wake of a corporate 
acquisition. 
  Table 4, summarizing the attributes of the respondents’ nonsubscription plans, reveals 
that the benefits typically offered were in some respects more generous, and in other respects less 
generous, than the workers’ compensation regime.  On one hand, across all industries and 
                                                 
68 The absence of any early-cohort firms that consulted with PartnerSource during the initial nonsubscription process 




cohorts, the majority of nonsubscribers imposed no maximum dollar amount on weekly wage-
replacement benefits, as opposed to the statutory maximum of $712 under workers’ 
compensation.  (Although wage-replacement rates were also nominally higher in most 
nonsubscription plans, because such benefits are taxable income – unlike under workers’ 
compensation – rates of wage replacement were similar in after-tax dollars.)  Also in marked 
contrast to workers’ compensation, most nonsubscribers offered first-day wage-replacement 
coverage.  Even among those nonsubscribers that did impose waiting periods, they were 
significantly shorter in duration (3-5 days) than under workers’ compensation (7 days).  Finally, 
although most nonsubscription plans limited the duration of wage-replacement benefits for 
temporary total disability, the average time limit (except for manufacturing) exceeded the 104-
week limit applicable under workers’ compensation.   
  On the other hand, several common features of nonsubscription plans appeared less 
advantageous to employees than workers’ compensation.  Regardless of industry or cohort, most 
firms imposed an end-of-shift or 24-hour reporting deadline, unlike the 30-day deadline for 
reporting workers’ compensation claims.
69  Most companies also declined to provide permanent 
partial and/or permanent total disability benefits (although manufacturing and early-cohort firms 
were slightly more likely to do so than other respondents)
70; and the majority limited the receipt 
of medical benefits to about two years (although the average time limit varied across industries 
and a significant minority of manufacturing and early-cohort firms imposed no time limits at all).  
                                                 
69 One prominent stakeholder (who requested anonymity) indicated that some nonsubscribers make exceptions, on a 
case-by-case basis, to their 24-hour (or end-of-shift) reporting policies (Telephone interview, October 13, 2009).  
However, since survey participants were not specifically asked whether (and if so, how often) they granted such 
exceptions, it was not possible to verify this claim.      
70 One prominent stakeholder (who requested anonymity) claimed that nonsubscribers occasionally provide injured 
workers with lump-sum settlements – including payments made outside the plan – that are, in effect, intended to 
compensate them for permanent disabilities, notwithstanding the fact that such injuries are technically outside the 
plan’s scope of coverage (Telephone interview, October 13, 2009).  If this is correct, then the apparent absence of 
permanent-disability coverage in nonsubscription plans could be misleading, at least for some firms.  However, 




Although most nonsubscription plans mimicked the statutory regime in offering both death and 
dismemberment benefits, such benefits were capped at anywhere from $100,000 (the average for 
manufacturing firms) to $302,000 (the average for services firms).  In contrast to the choice of 
provider permitted (with rare exceptions
71) under Texas workers’ compensation, most firms also 
directed injured employees’ medical care.   
  Interestingly, although most respondents described control over providers as a key benefit 
of nonsubscription, they did not all offer the same rationale for this view.  Some firms stressed 
the benefits that (allegedly) accrued to employees in the form of higher-quality care.  For 
example, one retail company emphasized that the capacity to direct an employee to a non-
workers’ compensation specialist meant that the worker could be treated “as a person, not a 
claim.”  On the other hand, other respondents viewed limitations on provider choice as a way to 
reduce fraudulent claims and/or moral hazard among health care providers.  For example, one 
restaurant claimed that under nonsubscription employees learned that “they couldn't game the 
system” as they allegedly did under workers’ compensation, and one services firm observed that 
under nonsubscription, the company could avoid the “knife happy physicians” to which workers’ 
compensation attorneys reportedly steered employees. 
  Presumably in an effort to limit their exposure to tort liability, the overwhelming majority 
of all firms (85%) used mandatory arbitration provisions, although half of manufacturing firms 
and of early-cohort firms did not.  Finally, most respondents imposed per-person and/or per-
event caps on the total amount of benefits that any employee could receive (although 21% of 
services firms and 44% of early-cohort firms did not).  
                                                 
71 Employers that belong to a Workers’ Compensation medical network can direct medical care under the auspices 




  Table 4 reveals another interesting cross-industry disparity.  Average excess liability 
deductibles (the amount at which excess liability coverage begins to cover a claim) were much 
lower in manufacturing than in other industries.  Moreover, manufacturing firms were much 
more likely than others to report that when a benefit time limit was reached for a given claim, an 
alternate policy (such as group health care and long-term disability coverage) would kick in.  It 
could be that manufacturing workers are at higher risk of experiencing catastrophic injuries, in 
which case one would expect firms in this sector both to purchase more excess liability coverage 
and to offer their workers greater insurance against long-term disability.  Available data seems to 
lend credence to this hypothesis.
72  In contrast, the majority of retail and services firms reported 
that they would try to reach a settlement if a plan-imposed time limit on benefits was reached.  
  Table 5 summarizes respondents’ reported experiences with nonsubscription.  For this 
section of the survey, each risk manager was initially asked whether (s)he deemed the program to 
be a success.  Regardless of industry or cohort, virtually all (94%) respondents said yes.  Of the 
remaining three companies – all of which belonged to the late cohort – one transportation 
company said that its experience with nonsubscription had been “hit or miss,” depending on the 
quality of the TPA; one retail company said it was “too soon to tell” because it had opted out so 
recently; and the third, a services company, said that it could not make informed comparisons 
because the TPA handled most aspects of its program.  With minor variations across industries, 
most respondents claimed to be tracking the success of their nonsubscription programs using 
data, although only about three-quarters reportedly calculated and compared costs per claim. 
                                                 
72 Based on national data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, manufacturing companies do in fact exhibit higher 
rates of serious injuries than companies in the retail and services sectors.  For injuries requiring days away from the 
work – the most severe category of nonfatal occupational injuries and illnesses – manufacturing companies in 2007 
reported an injury and illness rate of 1.3 per 100 full-time workers, as compared to 1.2 for retail companies and 1.1 
for companies in the services industry (as industries are defined in this Article).  See “Table 1. Incidence rates of 
nonfatal occupational injuries and illnesses by selected industries and case types, 2007” available at 




  Respondents’ opinions regarding the benefits, drawbacks, and surprises of 
nonsubscription displayed a remarkable degree of uniformity across industries and cohorts.  
Across all groups, benefits and positive surprises were cited much more frequently than 
drawbacks and negative surprises.  Virtually all respondents (98%) cited cost savings as a benefit 
of nonsubscription, and most (86%) cited the magnitude of cost savings as a positive surprise.  
The average reported cost savings for all groups exceeded 50%.  This was the case not only for 
the sample as a whole, but also for the subgroup of respondents that opted out before 2000 or 
after 2006, well before (or after) the three-year period (2002-2004) in which per-claim costs fell 
substantially within the Texas workers’ compensation system.
73  A substantial majority of 
respondents also cited greater control over medical providers and/or benefits, and higher-quality 
medical care for injured employees, as benefits.  The most commonly-cited drawback – tort 
liability – was mentioned by half of all respondents (albeit somewhat less frequently by retail 
firms and early-cohort members).   
  Notwithstanding such commonalities, the data did reveal interesting cross-group 
disparities in the perceived benefits, drawbacks, and surprises of nonsubscription.  For example, 
a disproportionate fraction of retail companies cited greater control over program benefits (61%) 
and less litigation (36%) as advantages, whereas manufacturing firms were more likely to 
emphasize faster return to work (86%), access to better doctors (71%), better safety outcomes 
(57%), and faster medical care (43%).  (The services sector fell in between these two extremes.) 
Manufacturing was also the only sector in which a substantial fraction (50%) of firms cited the 
lack of employee backlash as a positive surprise (which could reflect the industry’s much higher 
rates of unionization).  Manufacturing firms also held somewhat idiosyncratic views of the 
negative aspects of nonsubscription.  For example, unlike about a third of retail and services 
                                                 




companies, no manufacturing firm described educating its workforce as a burden of 
nonsubscription, a disparity that once again could be explained by the sector’s high rates of 
unionization.  Moreover, although at least a third of retail and services firms mentioned bad 
arbitration awards and/or the frequency of frivolous lawsuits as negative surprises, no 
manufacturing firms shared this view.  In fact, rather surprisingly, manufacturing firms (and 
members of the early cohort) reported no negative surprises at all. 
  Table 5 contains three other noteworthy findings.  First of all, a sizable minority of 
respondents (ranging from 12% in services to 29% in manufacturing) reported that the 
company’s experiences with nonsubscription caused them to change their safety practices in 
other states.  (For example, the online injury reporting system developed by one services 
company under nonsubscription was rolled-out nationwide to streamline reporting procedures. 
Similarly, another services company designed new documentation for claims reporting that was 
later adopted outside of Texas.)  Secondly, at some point during the interview, about a quarter of 
respondents volunteered their opinion (unprompted) that other states should allow the 
nonsubscription option.  Finally, although every risk manager was asked whether (s)he knew of 
any large, multi-state firms that had been nonsubscribers but subsequently re-joined the workers’ 
compensation system, all said no. 
  Finally, Table 6 examines various legal dimensions of nonsubscription.  The majority of 
respondents in all groups reported little or no trouble with litigation, and complaints about 
related issues (such as bad arbitration awards, frivolous lawsuits, and/or the frequency of internal 
appeals or lawsuits) were relatively rare.  However, manufacturing firms and early-cohort firms 
were considerably more likely than others to report at least “some” litigation troubles.  Similarly, 




$500,000, most manufacturing firms (83%) and two-thirds of early-cohort firms reported having 
done so.  Meanwhile, retail companies’ experiences with litigation seemed to be unusually 
favorable: not only did few report “trouble” with litigation and/or paying out expensive claims, 
but a sizable minority also described less litigation and the infrequency of internal appeals and 
lawsuits as benefits and/or positive surprises.
74 
  Another striking trend was the pervasive use of mandatory arbitration among 
nonsubscribers.  The overwhelming majority (85%) of respondents used such provisions, 
although they were much more common among retail, services, and late-cohort firms.  The 
bottom panel, which breaks down respondents by the use of mandatory arbitration, displays 
several salient patterns.  Although firms that use mandatory arbitration provisions did not 
mention reducing litigation as a reason for opting out of workers’ compensation, they were far 
more likely to describe tort liability as a drawback of nonsubscription – indeed, this concern may 
be what led them to adopt such provisions in the first place.  This theory is seemingly borne out 
by the fact that “trouble with litigation” and claims above $500,000 were much less common 
among firms that used mandatory arbitration.      
  Finally, it is interesting to note that about a quarter of all firms reported having settled 
claims outside of the nonsubscription plan.  The prevalence of this practice was particularly high 
among manufacturing firms (40%) and among early-cohort members (33%).  Moreover, as is 
revealed in the bottom panel, settlements outside of the plan were considerably more common 
among firms that used mandatory arbitration (31%) than among firms that did not (13%).  It is 
possible that such settlements had been offered to compensate workers for permanent disabilities 
                                                 
74 Several firms mentioned that they carried high-deductible insurance policies to help cover the cost of expensive 
tort judgments or settlements.  However, since respondents were not routinely asked whether they carried such 
policies, it is uncertain how many of the costly claims to which respondents alluded (i.e., those exceeding $500,000) 




that were technically outside the scope of the plan – a practice that one stakeholder claimed was 
not uncommon among large nonsubscribers.
75  However, since this follow-up question was not 
posed to the survey participants, this hypothesis could not be confirmed.   
 
VI. Conclusions & Suggestions for Future Research 
 
  Although participation in the workers’ compensation system is compulsory for virtually 
all private-sector employers, Texas’s unique law – the only truly elective statute in the U.S.
76 – 
presents researchers with a valuable opportunity to explore the “path not taken.”  Unlike in every 
other U.S. state, about one-third of Texas firms have elected to become “nonsubscribers” and 
opted out of the workers’ compensation system.  Remarkably, the prevalence of nonsubscription 
has been on the rise among very large firms, whose “deep pockets” might make them particularly 
averse to lawsuits by employees injured on the job.  Why are large employers choosing to forgo 
the benefits of tort immunity?  What are the real-world consequences for those firms that choose 
to become nonsubscribers?  Such questions have received almost no prior scholarly attention.      
  This Article is the first to comprehensively examine Texas nonsubscription from the 
perspective of companies that have opted out of workers’ compensation.  I focus on an important 
group of Texas firms – large companies that span many U.S. states.  This group is of particular 
interest not only because large companies usually employ full-time, professional risk managers 
who are well-informed about workers’ compensation and its alternatives, but also because large 
firms are the only group for which nonsubscription has been rising (and markedly so) in recent 
years.  Instead of letting injured workers without viable tort claims bear the costs of their own 
occupational injuries, these employers typically offer “home-grown” benefits plans to their 
Texas employees that approximate the benefits available through workers’ compensation.  After 
                                                 
75 See note 70. 




identifying those firms that met the study criteria, I administered a confidential phone survey to 
89% of this group to learn more about their attributes, motivations, behavior, and experiences.     
  The survey responses revealed many important trends.  Large, multi-state firms that 
nonsubscribed in recent years were likely to rely on consultants and/or third-party administrators 
to help guide them through the nonsubscription process and to administer their plan in 
subsequent years.  They were also likely to self-insure and/or use high-deductible plans in states 
that mandated workers’ compensation coverage.  Although a majority operated employee 
wellness programs, less than half used in-house first-aid clinics.  There were considerable 
disparities in the provision of other employee benefits such as group health plans, disability 
coverage, and life insurance; whereas most manufacturing firms and a majority of services firms 
offered such benefits to all workers, only a minority of retail firms did so.  
  For nearly all large, multi-state firms, the main reason for opting out of workers’ 
compensation was to achieve cost savings, although a sizable minority of respondents were also 
motivated by the desire to provide better care for employees, control medical providers, and/or 
control program benefits.  Firms did not seem to perceive the timing of the nonsubscription 
process as a strategically important decision, although some coordinated the start date with the 
beginning of the fiscal year or the renewal of contracts with insurers or third-party 
administrators.  A sizable minority of firms did change other policies or practices at the same 
time that they phased in a nonsubscription plan. 
  Overall, the occupational injury plans that nonsubscribers offered in lieu of workers’ 
compensation were remarkably homogenous.  Unlike workers’ compensation, most plans did not 
impose any maximum weekly dollar amount or waiting period on the receipt of wage-




temporary total disabilities typically exceeded the statutory cap.  On the other hand, most 
nonsubscription plans imposed end-of-shift or 24-hour reporting deadlines; did not cover partial 
total or permanent total disabilities; limited medical benefits to about two years; capped death 
and dismemberment benefits; and imposed per-person and/or per-event caps on total benefits.  
The vast majority of respondents also directed employees’ medical care.   
  There were also striking similarities in respondents’ reported experiences with 
nonsubscription.  Virtually all (94%) of firms judged these programs to be a success.  Not only 
did virtually all (98%) of companies report cost savings, but most were pleasantly surprised by 
the magnitude of these savings, which reportedly exceeded 50% (on average) across all 
industries.  Other commonly-cited benefits of nonsubscription were greater control over medical 
providers; greater control over program benefits; improved quality of medical care; faster return 
to work; and access to better doctors.  The only drawback or negative surprise cited by an 
appreciable number of respondents was tort liability, which half of all firms viewed as a 
drawback.  However, presumably in an effort to curb such liability, a very high fraction (about 
85%) of nonsubscriber plans channeled disputes to mandatory arbitration.  About a fifth of 
respondents reported that nonsubscription had affected safety practices outside of Texas, and a 
quarter spontaneously expressed a desire to spread nonsubscription to other states. 
  Although the majority of all survey respondents reported little or no trouble with 
litigation, follow-up questions revealed intriguing patterns across groups.  Manufacturing firms 
and companies that opted out in the early 1990s were the most likely to report “some” trouble 
with litigation.  At least two-thirds of respondents in all of these groups, for example, had paid 
out at least one claim exceeding $500,000.  At the other extreme, retail companies rarely 




$500,000.  The services sector fell somewhere between these two extremes.  Litigation trends 
also varied by the presence (or absence) of mandatory arbitration.  Firms that required mandatory 
arbitration were much less likely to report “trouble” with litigation, such as having paid out at 
least one half-million-dollar claim.  Finally, about a quarter of respondents in all industries 
reported having settled claims outside the plan, and this practice was especially common among 
firms that used mandatory arbitration.  
  Although the study findings help to illuminate the real-world consequences of 
nonsubscription for an important and growing segment of Texas employers, many critical 
questions merit further investigation.  First and foremost, the data consisted entirely of company 
self-reports, and as such were inherently prone to imprecision and subjectivity.  Lacking detailed 
claim records, I could not test in a rigorous manner whether – and if so, to what extent – 
nonsubscription truly affected the frequency, distribution, cost, or duration of occupational injury 
claims.  Secondly, my data did not allow me to test for the possibility of cost shifting.  For 
example, some occupational injuries that apparently “disappeared” with nonsubscription may 
have been covered by group health care plans and/or by private disability insurance, 
unbeknownst to the survey respondents.  If nonsubscription caused many workers’ compensation 
claims to “migrate” to non-occupational benefit programs in this manner, it could have decreased 
costs far less than the survey results suggested (or not at all).  Third, the experiences of small- 
and medium-sized nonsubscribers may have differed substantially from the experiences of the 
large, multi-state firms examined here.  Finally, my findings shed little light on the consequences 
of nonsubscription for affected employees.  Probing whether nonsubscription is a Pareto 
improvement – or simply redistributes economic surplus from employees to employers – is an 








TABLE 1. INDUSTRY CATEGORIZATIONS AND THRESHOLDS 
TOTAL NUMBER OF FIRMS IDENTIFIED (based on the thresholds below): 61 
 












Manufacturing  4,000 30  13  8 7 
Retail       31 28 
Restaurants 7,500  100  12  10 8 
Non-Restaurant Retail * 11,000  325  9  21 20 
Services       22 19 
Hotels 10,000  40  10  4  -- 
Transportation 2,800  11  7  4  -- 
Other Services ** 5,000  100  20  14  -- 
Total 61 54 
TOTAL NUMBER OF FIRMS SURVEYED: 54 (89% response rate) 
 
* Includes big-box retailers, department stores, gas stations, and supermarkets. 
** Includes assisted living facilities, banks, healthcare providers, and property management firms. 
 
NOTES: This table presents the minimum requirements for inclusion in this survey of large, multi-state firms that nonsubscribed from the Texas Workers’ 
Compensation system. Firms were identified through the assistance of industry stakeholders and through the analysis of a list of nonsubscribers maintained by the 
Division of Workers’ Compensation at the Texas Department of Insurance. All industry sub-groups reported above contain at least two firms that participated in the 
survey. Fields marked with “--” are intentionally left blank in order to preserve the anonymity of survey participants and their responses. 









By Industry  By Date of 
Nonsubscription*  Response 
Rate 
Manuf. Retail Services 1990-1994  1997-2009
% Firms Identified**  61 13%  51% 36%  [unknown]  [unknown]  
% Firms Surveyed***  54 --  --  --  19% 81%  54/61 
 
BASIC FIRM CHARACTERISTICS: 
Average Number of Employees:             
Nationwide 65,585  28,686  92,929  38,884  110,800  55,309  54/54 
In  Texas  6,742  4,634  9,359  3,662  12,565 5,419 54/54 
Average Number of Claims Per Year  3,866 1,640 5,210  2,545  5,989  3,495  47/54 
% Covering at Least 40 States  52% 14% 57%  58%  50%  52%  54/54 
% with Any Union Facilities  39% 83% 25%  47%  44%  38%  51/54 
% with Union Facilities in Texas  16%  50%  7%  18%  11%  17%  51/54 
 
RISK MANAGEMENT PROFILE: 
Uses Third-Party Administrator for 
Nonsubscription Claims  81% 50% 79%  94%  67%  84%  51/54 
Uses PartnerSource****  78% 50% 85%  78%  50%  85%  51/54 
Workers’ Comp. Plan Characteristics 
outside Texas (in at least one state):             
High-Deductible Plan  90%  100%  90%  88%  100%  89%  42/54 
Self-Insured 74%  67%  79%  68%  89%  70%  53/54 
Conventional Workers’ Compensation Plan  4%  0%  0%  11%  0%  5%  49/54 
 
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS PROFILE: 
Offers Wellness Program  74% 83% 74%  71%  67%  76%  50/54 
Uses In-House First-Aid Clinics  35% 50% 29%  35%  33%  35%  52/54 
Offers Group Health Insurance            54/54 
Yes – To All Employees  59%  86%  43%  74%  50%  61%   
Yes – To Full-Time/Salaried Employees  35%  0%  54%  21%  30%  36%   
No 2%  0%  4%  0%  10%  0%   
Don’t Know  4%  14%  0%  5%  10%  2%   
Offers Short-Term/Long-Term 
Disability Coverage            54/54 
Yes – To All Employees  56%  86%  39%  68%  50%  57%   
Yes – To Full-Time/Salaried Employees  33%  0%  57%  11%  30%  34%   
No 7%  0%  4%  16%  10%  7%   
Don’t Know  4%  14%  0%  5%  10%  2%   
Offers Life Insurance               54/54 
Yes – To All Employees  52%  86%  29%  74%  40%  55%   
Yes – To Full-Time/Salaried Employees  26%  0%  43%  11%  20%  27%   
No 11%  0%  14%  11%  10%  11%   
Don’t Know  11%  14%  14%  5%  30%  7%   
 
* Survey respondents opted out of workers’ compensation during the following years: 1990 (1 firm), 1991 (3 firms), 1992 (3 firms), 1993 (1 firm), 1994 (2 firms), 1997 
(1 firm), 1998 (1 firm), 1999 (3 firms), 2001 (2 firms), 2002 (3 firms), 2003 (5 firms), 2004 (6 firms), 2005 (8 firms), 2006 (5 firms), 2007 (5 firms), 2008 (4 firms); and 
various years between 2001 and 2009 (1 firm).  Fifteen firms opted out during the three-year period (2002-2004) when average cost per claim decreased significantly, 
and another fifteen firms opted out during the seven-year period (2000-2006) that includes the two years just prior to, and just subsequent to, this decline.   
** Percentages are calculated as a proportion of all firms identified.  The Date of Nonsubscription is not reported for Identified Firms because this information is not 
known for firms that declined to participate in the survey.    
***Percentages are calculated as a proportion of all firms surveyed.  Fields marked “--” have been left blank to preserve the anonymity of survey participants. 
**** PartnerSource is a consulting firm and insurance agency that designs programs and provides ongoing support for nonsubscribers in Texas. 
 
NOTES: This table presents results from a survey of 54 large, multi-state firms that opted out of workers’ compensation in Texas. Unless otherwise specified, 
percentages represent the fraction of all firms within the applicable column that answered the question and met the specified criterion.  (In other words, firms that 









By Industry  By Date of 
Nonsubscription  Response 
Rate  Manuf. Retail Services 1990-1994  1997-2009
Reasons for Nonsubscription (all that apply): 
              53/54 



































































































































































Timing of Nonsubscription (all that apply): 
              42/54 


























Renewal Date with Workers’ Compensation Insurance 

































































Changed Other Policies or Practices at the Time of 
Nonsubscription  32% 57% 27%  29%  22%  34%  50/54 
 
* Other entities with whom respondents reportedly consulted included independent consultants (3 respondents), the Texas Association of Responsible Nonsubscribers 
(TXANS) (2 respondents), the state of Texas (1 respondent), a risk management services firm (1 respondent), and a professor from a Texas university (1 respondent). 
 
NOTES: This table presents results from a survey of 54 large, multi-state firms that opted out of workers’ compensation in Texas. Unless otherwise specified, 
percentages represent the fraction of all firms within the applicable column that answered the question and met the specified criterion.  (In other words, firms that 
declined to respond and/or did not know the answer are excluded.)  The “Response Rate” column indicates the number of firms that responded to each question. 
 









By Industry  By Date of 
Nonsubscription  Response 
Rate 
Texas WC 
Statute  Manuf. Retail Services 1990-1994 1997-2009 
Reporting Deadline for Injuries:            54/54 30  Days 
24 Hours/Next Day  48%  14%  57%  47%  70%  43%     
End of Shift  39%  57%  32%  42%  20%  43%     
2-3 Days  4%  0%  4%  5%  0%  5%     
1 Year  2%  0%  4%  0%  0%  2%     
Don’t Know  7%  29%  4%  5%  10%  7%     
Time Limit on Medical Care:              
% with Limit  90%  60%  95%  93%  78%  94%  40/54  No Limit 
Limit in Weeks (if applicable)  107  80  107  113  111  106  35/54   
Wage-Replacement Benefits:               
% with Waiting Period  21%  17%  21%  21%  33%  18%  53/54   
Avg. Waiting Period in Days (if applicable)  4  3  5  3  4  4  11/54  7 Days 
Wage-Replacement Rate  88%  84%  89%  87%  88%  88%  52/54  70-75%** 
% with Maximum Weekly Dollar Amount  18%  40%  19%  11%  33%  15%  49/54   
Maximum Weekly $ Amount (if applicable)* $778  $700  $860  $650  $933  $700  9/54  $773*** 
% with Time Limit on Wage Benefits  94%  100%  100%  84%  89%  95%  51/54  104 (temp.) 
Time Limit in Weeks (if applicable)  115  96  120  115  143  110  47/54  401 (perm.) 
Covers Permanent Partial/Total 
Disabilities  4% 17% 0% 6%  11%  3%  48/54  Yes 
Offers Capped Dismemberment Benefit  92% 100% 92% 89%  78%  95%  51/54  70%  of 
Mean $ Cap in Thousands (if cap is known)  $231  $100  $200  $302  $350  $214  39/54  Wage† 
Offers Capped Death Benefit  92% 100% 92% 89%  78%  95%  51/54  75%  of 
Mean $ Cap in Thousands (if cap is known)  $231  $100  $200  $302  $350  $214  39/54  Wage 
Directs Medical Care  98% 100%  100% 94%  100%  98%  52/54  No†† 
Method(s) of Claim Dispute Resolution 




Mandatory Arbitration  85%  50%  89%  89%  50%  91%  52/54 
Internal Committee  70%  50%  68%  79%  71%  70%  50/54 
Mediation 10%  17%  0%  21%  0%  11%  52/54 
Limit on Total Benefits (in thousands, 
where applicable):              
% with No Limit  13%  0%  11%  21%  44%  7%  52/54  No Limit 
% with Per-Person Limit Only  60%  100%  59%  47%  44%  63%  52/54   
Average Per-Person Limit (for this group)  $283 $367 $231 $303  $375  $268  28/54   
% with Per-Person & Per-Event Limits  27%  0%  30%  32%  11%  30%  52/54   
Average Per-Person Limit (for this group)  $393 N/A $256  $575  $250  $404  14/54   
Average Per-Event Limit (for this group) $2,007  N/A  $625  $404  $500  $2,123  14/54   
Excess Liability Deductible under 
Nonsubscription Plan in Thousands  $2,381 $625 $3,288 $1,612 $3,700  $2,084  49/54   
Firm Response When Benefit Time Limit 
Is Reached (all that apply):           46/54   
Would Settle  59%  40%  60%  63%  67%  57%     
Never Happened  40%  40%  35%  50%  11%  47%     
Alternate Policy Picks-Up  30%  80%  24%  25%  44%  27%     
Benefits End  30%  20%  20%  50%  11%  35%  [47/54]   
* May be restricted by time limits and/or maximum medical improvement (MMI). 
** Employees that earn less than $8.50/hour receive wage replacement benefits at a rate of 75% of his/her lost wages for the first 26 weeks of disability and 70% of lost 
wages thereafter.  All other employees receive wage replacement at 70% of his/her lost wages (Texas Labor Code § 408.103). 
*** Although in theory the wage replacement rate is 70-75%, the proportion may be much lower for higher-income workers, because the wage level is capped at the 
State Average Weekly Wage (SAWW) (Texas Labor Code § 408.061).  In 2006, the method for calculating the SAWW was revised, resulting in a significant increase 
in the maximum weekly benefit, so that fewer workers have been limited by the statutory cap. See Eccleston, Radeva, Telles, Yang, and Tanabe (2009, 19). 
† Subject to a maximum of 70% of the state average weekly wage, for up to 401 weeks. 
†† The employee can choose his/her own medical provider unless the employer belongs to a Workers’ Compensation medical network. 
††† The employee can opt for a contested case hearing in lieu of arbitration.  If desired, appeals and requests for judicial review can be filed with the Appeals Panel and 
the State County Court, respectively (Texas Labor Code § 410). 
NOTES: This table presents results from a survey of 54 large, multi-state firms that opted out of workers’ compensation in Texas. Unless otherwise specified, 
percentages represent the fraction of all firms within the column that answered the question and met the specified criterion.  (In other words, firms that declined to 
respond and/or did not know the answer are excluded.)  The “Response Rate” column indicates the number of firms that responded to each question. Response rates 
vary due to some respondents’ unfamiliarity with detailed attributes of their nonsubscription plans.  Characteristics of Texas’s Workers’ Compensation statute are 










By Industry  By Date of 
Nonsubscription  Response 
Rate  Manuf. Retail Services 1990-1994 1997-2009
Considers Nonsubscription to Be Successful:           54/54 
Yes 94% 100%  96% 89%  100%  93%   
Uncertain (too soon to tell and/or don’t track outcomes) 4%  0%  4%  5%  0%  5%   
Hit-or-Miss, Depending on Third-Party Administrator 2%  0%  0%  5%  0%  2%   
Tracks Success of Nonsubscription with Data  91% 86%  100% 79%  90%  91%  54/54 
Tracks Cost Per Claim (among firms that track data) 76%  83%  72%  79%  75%  76%  45/54 
Benefits:           54/54 
Cost Savings 98%  100%  96%  100%  100%  98%   
Estimated % Cost Savings (only if exists & % was given) 58%  62%  60%  54%  63%  58%  [38/54] 
Estimated % Savings if opted out before 2000 or after 2006* 53% 57%  56% 43%  63%  45%  [15/24] 
More Control over Medical Providers/Benefits 74%  71%  82%  63%  80%  73%   
Employees Receive Better Care 64% 86%  64% 56%  70%  63%   
More Control over Program Benefits 50%  14%  61%  47%  50%  50%   
Employees Return to Work Faster 46%  86%  32%  53%  60%  43%   
Access to Better Doctors 46%  71%  32%  58%  30%  50%   
Better Safety Outcomes 35%  57%  32%  32%  30%  36%   
Fewer Injury Claims Filed 28%  43%  29%  21%  20%  30%   
Less Litigation 22%  14%  36%  5%  20%  23%   
Faster Medical Care 19%  43%  7%  26%  20%  18%   
Faster Claim Closing 17%  14%  21%  11%  10%  18%   
Less Ambiguity in Processing of Claims 15%  0%  18%  16%  10%  16%   
Faster Injury Reporting 13%  33%  7%  16%  10%  14%   
Access Better Doctors through Higher Doctor Pay 9%  14%  11%  5%  10%  9%   
Can Keep Closer Tabs on Each Claim 2%  0%  0%  5%  0%  2%   
Reported Any Positive Surprises  39% 29%  46% 32%  40%  39%  53/54 
Among Firms Citing Positive Surprises:             
Magnitude of Cost Savings 86%  100%  77%  100%  100%  82%   
Infrequent Internal Appeals/Lawsuits 24%  0%  38%  0%  25%  24%   
Lack of Employee Backlash 14%  50%  15%  0%  0%  18%   
Ease of Administration 5%  0%  8%  0%  0%  6%   
Ability to Recover from Third Parties 5%  0%  8%  0%  25%  0%   
Drawbacks:           54/54 
Tort Liability 50%  57%  43%  58%  30%  55%   
Burden of Educating Workforce 30%  0%  36%  32%  40%  27%   
General Administrative Time and Hassle 19%  14%  25%  11%  20%  18%   
Burden of Educating Management 15%  14%  18%  11%  10%  16%   
Resistance from Management 4%  14%  0%  5%  0%  5%   
Burden of Finding Suitable Medical Providers 4%  14%  4%  0%  0%  5%   
Employees Lose Benefits for Late Reporting 2%  0%  4%  0%  10%  0%   
Arbitration Can Be Unfair to Employees 2%  14%  0%  0%  0%  2%   
Employee Doubts about Quality of Care 2%  0%  4%  0%  0%  2%   
Burden of Directly Supervising Medical Care 2%  0%  4%  0%  0%  2%   
More Claims Are Shifted to Group Health 2%  0%  4%  0%  10%  0%   
Reported Any Negative Surprises  11% 0%  11%  16%  0%  14%  53/54 
Among Firms Citing Negative Surprises:             
Large Arbitration Awards 50%  N/A  33%  67%  N/A  50%   
High Frequency of Frivolous Lawsuits 33%  N/A  33%  33%  N/A  33%   
Too Few Third-Party Administrators from Which to Choose 17%  N/A  33%  0%  N/A  17%   
High Frequency of Internal Appeals/Lawsuits 17%  N/A  0%  33%  N/A  17%   
Nonsubscription Affected Safety Practices outside Texas  21% 29%  25% 12%  20%  21%  52/54 
Expressed Desire to Opt Out in other States  26% 29%  29% 21%  10%  30%  54/54 
Knows of a Former Large, Multi-State Nonsubscriber 
that Returned to the Workers’ Compensation System 0% 0%  0% 0%  0%  0%  54/54 
* Because average costs per claim under Texas workers’ compensation fell markedly from 2002 to 2004, this line reports estimated cost savings only among firms that answered 
this question and did not opt out between 2000 and 2006.   When only firms that opted out between 2002 and 2004 were excluded, the percentages were even closer to those for 
the entire sample.  (The “across all firms” percentages were identical, and those for individual industries and cohorts differed by no more than six percentage points.) 
 
NOTES: This table presents results from a survey of 54 large, multi-state firms that opted out of workers’ compensation in Texas. Unless otherwise specified, percentages 
represent the fraction of all firms within the applicable column that answered the question and met the specified criterion.  (In other words, firms that declined to respond and/or 









By Industry  By Date of 
Nonsubscription  Response 
Rate  Manuf. Retail Services 1990-1994 1997-2009
 
OVERVIEW OF LEGAL ISSUES: 
Uses Mandatory Arbitration in the Event of a 
Claim Dispute*  85% 50% 89% 89%  50%  91%  52/54 
Mentioned Reducing Litigation as a Reason for 
Nonsubscription*  6% 0% 7% 5%  33%  0%  53/54 
Any Trouble with Litigation?          53/54 
No 45% 29% 43% 56%  30%  49%   
Hardly Any (no) 36%  29%  43%  28%  30%  37%   
Some (yes) 15%  43%  14%  6%  40%  9%   
Yes 4% 0% 0% 11%  0%  5%   
Has Paid Nonsubscription Claims over $500k  31% 83% 22% 28%  67%  24%  51/54 
Has Paid More than One Claim over $500k  14% 50% 4%  17%  22%  12%  50/54 
Has Settled outside the Plan  27% 40% 22% 31%  33%  25%  41/54 
 
DRAWBACKS AND NEGATIVE SURPRISES: 
Mentioned Tort Liability as a Drawback*  50% 57% 43% 58%  30%  55%  54/54 
Mentioned Large Arbitration Awards as a 
Negative Surprise*  6% 0% 4% 11%  0%  7%  53/54 
Mentioned Frequency of Frivolous Lawsuits as a 
Negative Surprise*  4% 0% 4% 5%  0%  5%  53/54 
Mentioned High Frequency of Internal 
Appeals/Lawsuits as a Negative Surprise*  2% 0% 0% 5%  0%  2%  53/54 
 
ADVANTAGES AND POSITIVE SURPRISES: 
Mentioned Less Litigation as a Benefit*  22% 14% 36%  5%  20%  23%  54/54 
Mentioned Infrequency of Internal 
Appeals/Lawsuits as a Positive Surprise*  9% 0%  19% 0%  11%  9%  53/54 
 





Among Firms That Use 
Mandatory Arbitration:
Among Firms That Do 




Mentioned Reducing Litigation as a Reason for 
Nonsubscription*  6% 0%  25% 51/54 
Mentioned Tort Liability as a Drawback of 
Nonsubscription*  50% 52%  38%  54/54 
Any Trouble with Litigation?       52/54 
No 45% 52%  0%   
Hardly Any (no) 36%  34%  57%   
Some (yes) 15%  9%  43%   
Yes 4% 5%  0%   
Has Paid Nonsubscription Claims over $500k  31% 24%  63%  52/54 
Has Paid More than One Claim over $500k  14% 10%  38%  52/54 
Has Settled outside the Plan  27% 31%  13%  52/54 
 
* Similar information is presented in earlier tables.  In this table, however, figures are uniformly calculated as a percentage of all firms that answered the question.  (In 
some previous tables, figures are calculated as a percentage of the subgroup of firms that answered “yes” to a previous question.)  
 
NOTES: This table presents results from a survey of 54 large, multi-state firms that opted out of workers’ compensation in Texas. Unless otherwise specified, 
percentages represent the fraction of all firms within the applicable column that answered the question and met the specified criterion.  (In other words, firms that 









Process of Nonsubscription 
 
a.  When did you non-subscribe? 
b.  How and when did you first learn of non-subscription as an option in Texas? 
c.  Did you consult with outside parties, such as other companies or your Third Party 
Administrator (TPA), in choosing to become a nonsubscriber? 
d.  Why did you non-subscribe? 
e.  After you decided to become a non-subscriber, how did you choose when to switch to 
nonsubscription? 




Experience with Nonsubscription (relative to workers’ compensation) 
 
a.  Do you think non-subscription has been successful?  If so, why and how? 
b.  What are the benefits and drawbacks of non-subscription for your company? 
c.  What are the challenges, logistical or otherwise, with nonsubscription for your company? 
d.  Have you had much trouble with litigation under nonsubscription? 
e.  Have you had any large litigated nonsubscription claims, over $500,000? 
f.  Do you use data to systematically measure the success of non-subscription? 
  If so, what types of benchmarks do you use (such as cost per claim or other measures)? 
g.  Have there been any surprises with nonsubscription, either positive or negative? 
h.  Has nonsubscription affected company safety practices outside of Texas? If so, how? 
 
 
Nonsubscription Plan Characteristics: 
 
a.  What is the deadline for notifying the company of an injury?  
b.  Is there a time limit on medical benefits?  
c.  What is the waiting period for receiving wage-replacement benefits?  
d.  What is the wage replacement rate?  
e.  Is there a maximum weekly wage benefit?  If so, what is it?  
f.  Is there a limit to the number of weeks of disability? If so, what is it?  
g.  Can employees choose their own doctor?  
h.  Do you provide a benefit for permanent partial disabilities?  
i.  Do you provide a death benefit? If so, what is it?  
j.  What is the limit on for dismemberment benefits?  
k.  What is the method for resolving claim disputes?  
l.  What is the total cap on benefits, if there is one?  
                                                 
77 This script was followed loosely, and questions inviting more than a straightforward factual answer were posed in 




m. What happens if there are still ongoing medical costs or lost time when a nonsub claim 
reaches the time limit of the nonsubscription plan (do you settle the claims, could another 
insurance policy cover some of the ongoing costs)?  
n.  Have you ever provide benefits outside the plan? 
o.  Do you have excess liability coverage?  If so, when does it kick in? 
 
 
Basic Company Information 
 
a.  Roughly how many employees does your company have nationwide?  In Texas?   
b.  How many locations do you have nationwide?     
c.  In about how many states do you operate?   
d.  About how many workers compensation claims do you handle per year?   
e.  Do you self-insure in workers’ compensation states where you have the option? 
  If you do not self-insure, do you have a high deductible workers’ compensation plan? 
f.  Do you have in-house clinics that handle first aid claims?   
g.  Do you have employee wellness programs? If so, when did they start? 
h.  Do you have any union locations?  In Texas? 
i.  Do you handle nonsubscription claims in-house, or use a Third Party Administrator (TPA)? 
j.  Are your employees eligible for:  
i.  Group health insurance 
ii.  Long term disability insurance 
iii.  Short term disability insurance 
iv.  Life insurance 
k.  What other benefits does your company offer? 
l.  Do these benefits vary across states, particularly in and out of Texas? 






a.  Do you know of any company that was a nonsubscriber, but then returned to the workers’ 
compensation system in Texas? 
 
                                                 
78 The survey also included four questions regarding a planned future study of detailed claim-level data provided by 
a subset of the survey respondents.  These questions were the following: “Did you know this study was being 
conducted?”; “How did you learn about it?”; “Did you consider participating in the data portion of the study?”; and 
“Why did you decline to participate in the data portion of Prof. Morantz’s study of non-subscription?”.  Because 
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